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United States v. Windsor:
The Marital Deduction That Changed Marriage
Lee-ford Tritt*
In June 2013, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Windsor,1
a landmark case that fundamentally transformed not only American tax
jurisprudence and practice, but American constitutional law as well. In
Windsor, the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of same-sex marriages at the federal level in the context of a contested estate tax return.
At the outset, it should be understood that Windsor was not a pure tax
case, but a constitutional law case wrapped in tax clothing. This is an
important distinction because the wake of Windsor reaches far beyond
tax law and estate planning.
I. THE PRE-WINDSOR WORLD
A brief review of both the Baehr v. Lewin2 case and the so-called
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) will provide relevant context for
the discussion concerning Windsor’s influence.
A. Baehr v. Lewin.
In 1993, the Hawaiian Supreme Court held that denying same-sex
marriage licenses was sex-based discrimination in Baehr v. Lewin,3 a
lawsuit in which three same-sex couples argued that Hawaii’s prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection clause of the
Hawaiian State Constitution.4 The Hawaiian Supreme Court remanded
the case back to the trial court for a determination of whether the state
could show a compelling reason for the justification of the same-sex
marriage ban,5 and the trial court judge rejected the state’s justifications
* Lee-ford Tritt, NYU School of Law, J.D., LL.M. (taxation), is a law professor at
the University of Florida College of Law, Director of the Center for Estate Planning, and
a Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. Before joining UF College of Law in 2005, Lee-ford spent eight years in the New York City trusts and estates
departments of Davis, Polk & Wardwell and Milbank, Tweed.
1 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
3 Id. at 67.
4 Id. at 49-50.
5 Id. at 68.
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for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.6 The Hawaiian State Legislature, however, promptly proposed a constitutional amendment that
expressly reserved the legislature the power to relegate marriage to opposite-sex couples only—and the amendment was passed by the Hawaiian voters in 1998.7
B. The Defense of Marriage Act.
Although Hawaii ended up prohibiting same-sex marriage at the
time, the Baehr decision is seen as the impetus for the enactment of
DOMA.8 DOMA was signed into law by President Clinton in 1996.9
Notably, at the time DOMA was enacted, neither same-sex marriage
nor polygamous marriage was legal in any state, territory, or U.S. possession. Section 2 of DOMA was an exercise of Congressional discretion granted under Article IV, section 1 of the United States
Constitution, commonly called the Full Faith and Credit Clause.10 This
section purported to grant states autonomy in choosing whether to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other U.S. jurisdictions by providing an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Section 3 of
DOMA restricted, for all federal purposes, the definitions of “marriage”
and “spouse” to opposite-sex couples, even though at the time no states
allowed or recognized same-sex marriage.11 Moreover, the federal enactment of DOMA prompted state legislatures to enact reform measures that banned same-sex marriage and prohibited the recognition of
legally married same-sex couples from other states.12
II.

UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR

In June 2013, the Supreme Court concluded in Windsor that section
3 of DOMA was unconstitutional because it denied same-sex couples
6

Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 (Cir. Ct. Haw. Dec. 3,

1996).
7 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, 6 (1996) (discussing the legislative response to
Baehr). In 2013, the state legislature eventually legalized same-sex marriage under the
Hawaii Marriage Equality Act.
8 See id.
9 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)) [hereinafter DOMA].
10 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
11 DOMA, supra note 9. Section 3 became the subject of most of the controversy
surrounding the Act, and the challenged provision in United States v. Windsor. As states
began to permit same-sex marriages, DOMA had the effect of creating two-tiers of marriages: those that were recognized by the federal government and those that were not.
12 See generally Lee-ford Tritt, Windsor’s Wake: Non-Traditional Estate Planning
Issues for Non-Traditional Families, 48 U. MIAMI HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 11,
p. 78 (2014) (detailing a timeline and an index of citations to the state legislative statutes
and constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage).
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“equal liberty” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.13 Beyond the significance of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, Windsor is of import in that the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutional requirements of the federal government concerning state
marriage determinations.
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer had been in a committed relationship for approximately 30 years. They were residents of New York,
where they lived together. In 1993, Windsor and Spyer registered as
domestic partners in New York City. In 2007, Windsor and Spyer (still
New York residents) were married in a lawful ceremony in Canada. In
2009, Spyer died leaving her entire estate to Windsor and naming Windsor as executor. Windsor sought to claim the federal estate tax marital
deduction under section 2056(a) of the Code for all property passing to
her as a result of Spyer’s death. The I.R.S. denied the marital deduction
based upon Section 3 of DOMA.14 Consequently, Spyer’s estate was
subject to more than $360,000 in estate tax. The estate paid the tax and
Windsor filed suit in the United States District Court seeking a refund
of the estate taxes paid and a declaration that Section 3 of DOMA was
unconstitutional.15
The suit began with a procedural oddity: because of the Obama
Administration’s position on same-sex marriage, the Department of Justice made the controversial decision to decline to defend DOMA, so the
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives (“BLAG”) intervened as an interested party for the sole purpose of defending the statute on behalf of the government.16
The Southern District of New York used rational basis analysis to
find Section 3 of DOMA—the section containing gender-specific definitions of “marriage” and “spouse”—unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.17 Thus, Windsor
was granted her motion for summary judgment. Notably, the court applied a “heightened” form of rational basis review that required BLAG
to show with “special clarity” the federal government’s interest in intervention.18 The court declined to consider whether a more stringent
equal protection test was necessary for gay and lesbian persons “because the Court believes that the constitutional question presented here

13
14
15
16
17
18

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
Id. at 2683.
Id.
Id. at 2683-84.
Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D. N.Y. 2012).
Id. at 402.
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may be disposed of under a rational basis review, [therefore] it need not
decide whether homosexuals are a suspect class.”19
In a 2-1 opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
District Court’s holding, but conducted its analysis using intermediate
scrutiny under the equal protection paradigm, making the express conclusion that gay and lesbian persons are in a quasi-suspect class.20 The
court held that the classification of marriage effected by DOMA was not
substantially related to any important government interest and therefore concluded that Section 3 was unconstitutional.21 The court also addressed an underlying standing issue, specifically, whether New York
recognized Windsor and Spyer’s Canadian marriage at the time of
Spyer’s death in 2009.22 Speculating that New York probably would
have recognized the marriage,23 the court found that Windsor did have
standing to appeal.24
On December 7, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear Windsor.25 The Court released its 5-4 decision on June
26, 2013.26 Reasoning that the regulation of marriage is, and has historically been, the exclusive province of the states to which the federal government has no interest, the Court concluded that Congress’s attempt to
intervene with the imposition of DOMA was evidence of animus.27
Windsor “stands for the proposition that the Internal Revenue Code
cannot be applied in a manner that would disregard for tax purposes an
individual’s marital status determined under state law except to the extent required by a federal law enacted with a purpose of advancing a
legitimate tax policy.”28 Moreover, because the “avowed purpose and
19

Id. at 401-02.
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2012).
21 Id. at 188.
22 Id. at 177-78.
23 Id. While New York did not itself license same-sex marriages at that time, it is a
somewhat open question as to whether it recognized same-sex marriages performed in
foreign jurisdictions before 2011. Rather than certifying the question to the New York
Court of Appeals (New York’s highest state court), the court opted to “predict” state
common law by relying on rulings of intermediate courts. Here, all intermediate appellate New York courts that had considered the issue—three of the four appellate divisions—had found that New York did recognize foreign same-sex marriages based on New
York’s common-law marriage recognition rule that recognizes marriages valid in the foreign jurisdiction in which they were performed and not in contravention of New York
statute or public policy.
24 Id.
25 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786, 786-87 (2012) (granting certiorari).
26 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675-76 (2013).
27 Id. at 2693.
28 Carlyn S. McCaffrey & John C. McCaffrey, Obergefell and the Authority of the
IRS to Challenge Valid Marriages and Divorces, STEVE LEIMBERG’S EST. PLAN. EMAIL
NEWSL. no. 2345, Sept. 21, 2015.
20
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practical effect” of DOMA was to impose “a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States,” DOMA’s Section 3
was found to be an unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty
of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment.29 The Supreme
Court ruled that Section 3 was an unconstitutional “deprivation of the
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment,” and that the
Constitution prevents the federal government from treating same-sex
marriages any differently from heterosexual marriages.30 Such differentiation, the Court reasoned, would “[demean] the couple, whose moral
and sexual choices the Constitution protects.”31
It is critical to note several oft-overlooked or mischaracterized aspects of the decision. First, the Court did not hold DOMA itself unconstitutional, but rather only section 3 of DOMA. Section 3 of DOMA
was the only section at issue in the case and, in fact, the Court did not
opine about Section 2 of DOMA.32 Because of Windsor’s narrow holding concerning DOMA—that is to say, a holding applicable only to Section 3 of DOMA—the recognition of same-sex marriages continued to
generate debate on both the federal and state levels after Windsor.
Second, while Windsor had a direct effect on the interpretation and
administration of federal tax law, Windsor did not directly amend the
federal tax law. Windsor’s immediate impact, however, was on federal
tax law and the estate planning profession. The inconsistent and everchanging jurisprudential landscape concerning the validity or recognition of same-sex marriages from state to state raised serious conflict of
law questions and impacted the implementation of various federal benefits for same-sex married couples depending on whether the couple lived
in a recognition state or non-recognition state.33
III. WINDSOR’S WAKE
When Windsor was decided on June 26, 2013, same-sex marriage
was already allowed in thirteen states. Immediately following Windsor,
federal and state courts were flooded with litigation related to the decision. Tellingly, Tom Watts writes that “[t]he marriage equality cases
may represent the first time in American legal history that a single constitutional question has been so rapidly and broadly litigated.”34 There
29

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2696.
Id. at 2695.
31 Id. at 2694.
32 Id. at 2682-83.
33 See, e.g., Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage
Equality Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S52, S59-60 (2015).
34 Id. at S53.
30
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were constitutional challenges in thirty-seven states covering nine federal circuits.35 After the decision in Windsor, four Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal upheld District Court decisions invalidating prohibitions on same-sex marriages36 and one decision by the Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a ban on same-sex marriage.37 Obergefell v. Hodges38
resulted from the consolidation of these cases, under which the right to a
same-sex marriage became fundamental.39

35

Id. at S81.
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 495 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648,
672 (7th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. Smith,
760 F.3d 1070, 1096 (10th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th
Cir. 2014).
37 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 420 (6th Cir. 2014).
38 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
39 See id. at 2593, 2608. For a discussion concerning Obergefell and its impact, see
Lee-ford Tritt, Moving Forward by Looking Back: The Retroactive Application of
Obergefell, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 873 (2016).
36

